Cases - Collins (Contractors) Ltd v Baltic Quay Management Ltd

Record details

Name
Collins (Contractors) Ltd v Baltic Quay Management Ltd
Date
[2004]
Citation
EWCA Civ 1757
Legislation

Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996

Keywords
Adjudication - adjudicator - dispute - meaning of dispute
Summary

The employer failed to issue withholding notices but sought to deduct sums from an interim application. The contractor sought to enforce these rights in court. The employer sought to have the court proceedings stayed on the basis of an arbitration agreement. The contractor argued that there was no real dispute as to the absence of withholding notices and therefore the application for the stay for arbitration should be refused.

In considering the meaning of 'dispute' the Court of Appeal adopted a seven-point test proposed by Jackson J in AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v The Secretary of State for Transport (2004). That test was as follows:

'From this review of the authorities I derive the following seven propositions:

  1. The word "dispute" which occurs in many arbitration clauses and also in section 108 of the Housing Grants Act should be given its normal meaning. It does not have some special or unusual meaning conferred upon it by lawyers.
  2. Despite the simple meaning of the word "dispute", there has been much litigation over the years as to whether or not disputes existed in particular situations. This litigation has not generated any hard-edged legal rules as to what is or is not a dispute. However, the accumulating judicial decisions have produced helpful guidance.
  3. The mere fact that one party (whom I shall call "the claimant") notifies the other party (whom I shall call "the respondent") of a claim does not automatically and immediately give rise to a dispute. It is clear, both as a matter of language and from judicial decisions, that a dispute does not arise unless and until it emerges that the claim is not admitted.
  4. The circumstances from which it may emerge that a claim is not admitted are Protean. For example, there may be an express rejection of the claim. There may be discussions between the parties from which objectively it is to be inferred that the claim is not admitted. The respondent may prevaricate, thus giving rise to the inference that he does not admit the claim. The respondent may simply remain silent for a period of time, thus giving rise to the same inference.
  5. The period of time for which a respondent may remain silent before a dispute is to be inferred depends heavily upon the facts of the case and the contractual structure. Where the gist of the claim is well known and it is obviously controversial, a very short period of silence may suffice to give rise to this inference. Where the claim is notified to some agent of the respondent who has a legal duty to consider the claim independently and then give a considered response, a longer period of time may be required before it can be inferred that mere silence gives rise to a dispute.
  6. If the claimant imposes upon the respondent a deadline for responding to the claim, that deadline does not have the automatic effect of curtailing what would otherwise be a reasonable time for responding. On the other hand, a stated deadline and the reasons for its imposition may be relevant factors when the court comes to consider what is a reasonable time for responding.
  7. If the claim as presented by the claimant is so nebulous and ill-defined that the respondent cannot sensibly respond to it, neither silence by the respondent nor even an express non-admission is likely to give rise to a dispute for the purposes of arbitration or adjudication.'